2019年9月20日 星期五

mStar of AMT

American Tower Remains Our Favorite Tower Company After Excellent Quarter, but All Are Overvalued
Matthew Dolgin
Equity Analyst
Analyst Note | by Matthew Dolgin Updated Aug 01, 2019

A strong U.S. market is driving macro tower demand for all the tower companies we cover, and American Tower's second-quarter results show it is no exception. We don't expect the higher level of tower revenue growth will materially wane any time soon, as increasing mobile data use and 5G deployment will require carriers to maintain high levels of spending. We think those factors dwarf potential headwinds from U.S. carrier consolidation, which will likely lead to incrementally higher churn over time but may be largely offset by spending from Dish. Nonetheless, with few surprises in American Tower's report, we expect only a modest increase in our $160 fair value estimate. Although American Tower is our favorite and we expect relative long-term outperformance versus peers SBA and Crown Castle, we currently see all tower companies as materially overvalued.

American Tower's U.S. growth was again stronger than SBA's, but unlike SBA, American Tower's growth rate on existing towers decelerated. Organic growth on existing U.S. towers was 7.5% year over year, down from about 8% growth each of the past two quarters. We attribute the deceleration primarily to tougher comparisons American Tower now faces, as the second quarter last year was when the firm first took a big step up in growth. We forecast the growth rate to average 7% over the next several years.

As expected, international performance was again affected by churn resulting from carrier consolidation in India, which led to a 3.6% decline in existing tower revenue, an improvement over last quarter. Indian churn should come down substantially by the fourth quarter, which is when we expect international revenue to return to growth. Adjusted for the abnormal churn, international revenue on existing towers grew 8%, similar to our long-term projections.

Business Strategy and Outlook | by Matthew Dolgin Updated Mar 02, 2019

We think American Tower's strategy to diversify its tower portfolio globally leaves it best positioned among the three U.S. tower companies, as it is primed to benefit from the continually increasing demand in mobile data worldwide.

The tower business in general is very attractive. Wireless carriers enter long-term leases that include rent escalators (annual increases of about 3% in the United States and generally tied to inflation internationally), which gives the firm a highly visible and stable revenue stream, and towers have significant operating leverage. Adding tenants to existing towers and equipment upgrades by tenants both provide sharp revenue increases while adding little incremental cost. As data use grows and networks get more stretched, locating equipment on more towers and upgrading equipment are primary solutions for carriers. Consumers' ever-increasing need for mobile data and little geographic overlap with competitors result in normalized churn of about 1%.

We think American Tower is well served being the market leader in the U.S, which is the most profitable market. American Tower generates more than half its total revenue and has about one fourth of its towers in the country. In addition to being the most profitable geography, the U.S. growth trajectory remains strong. Mobile data use has been growing 30%-40% per year and is expected to continue at a similar clip through 2021. We think the looming upgrade to 5G networks will extend the required carrier investment for years to come.

American Tower's international growth has been depressed recently due to consolidation of mobile carriers in India, which has led to high churn. We expect conditions to largely improve after 2019. Long term, we think prospects are bright in American Tower's international markets, which are dominated by India, Brazil, and Mexico. Many international markets are a decade behind the U.S. and are now building their 4G networks. Indian data usage has been growing 100% per year, and carriers have been substantially increasing spending to improve networks. Latin American countries now have over 200 million people in the middle class, making them potential smartphone users.

Economic Moat | by Matthew Dolgin Updated Mar 02, 2019

We assign American Tower a narrow economic moat due to the efficient scale that underlies the tower industry and switching costs that make tenants loath to seek alternative providers once they have installed their equipment on towers. American Tower's returns returns have exceeded 10% in each of the last 10 years, above the 8% weighted average cost of capital we estimate for the firm. Given the critical nature towers play in allowing the public access to mobile data, the lack of near-term substitutes to towers, and the barriers to alternative tower providers, we expect excess returns to continue for the next decade as well, resulting in our narrow moat rating.

The overriding feature of the tower business is the extreme operating leverage inherent in it. Costs to the tower provider are mostly fixed per tower, meaning costs to operate a tower are virtually the same whether a tower has one tenant or several tenants. Tower operating expenses typically consist primarily of the rent expense the companies pay to lease the land, which is subject to multiyear leases. The tower business is very capital intensive, and returns are typically not good unless or until the tower provider can secure multiple tenants on the tower, a feat made more difficult for a competitor by the limited pool of potential customers. In the U.S., for example, over 90% of American Tower's 2018 revenue was generated by only the big four wireless service providers, or carriers. Customer concentration is similar throughout the industry, and it applies in American Tower's other markets as well, though not to the same extent. Customer concentration levels in American Tower's other geographies range between 60% and 80% and should increase as carrier consolidation in those markets continues.

American Tower states that an average U.S. tower costs about $275,000 to build; rents for the initial tenant are about $20,000 per year; and the company's operating expenses with one tenant on the tower are $12,000, resulting in only a 3% return. By American Tower's estimates, the return jumps to 13% once it has added the second tenant and can reach 24% with a third. Globally, American Tower averaged 1.9 tenants per tower at the end of 2017. Consequently, even before considering other hurdles an upstart competitor would have to overcome to compete on American Tower's turf, it would have to contemplate sinking tremendous amounts of capital into building towers, locking itself into $1,000 per month land lease payments over a term of 5-10 years, and, given a likely need to offer lower average prices to carriers to entice them to switch, would need to average close to two tenants per tower in hopes of generating a slim excess return on its capital. As a reference, Crown Castle has stated that it has historically added tenants per tower at a rate of about one every 10 years.

We think the existing efficient scale alone is a deterrent to competitors, but they would have other obstacles to procuring carriers' business. First, because carriers own and are responsible for the equipment they deploy at and on the towers, they bear the brunt of removing it when they leave the towers. Industry peer Crown Castle has stated that it costs carriers about $40,000 to remove equipment from a tower in the U.S. With American Tower's U.S. tenants paying between $20,000 and $30,000 per year in rent, it means they would have to recoup one and a half to two years' worth of rent payments to break even. A rival would need to undercut American Tower's prices by that much more to make up for the loss carriers would be facing in deciding to switch, further impeding a competitor's prospects of generating excess returns. Yet direct costs are not the only switching costs carriers face. Carriers' most valuable assets are their networks, and any disruption to the network, whether temporarily during a tower switch or more permanently as a result of a new setup and location, risks customer dissatisfaction with their service. Given the negligible switching costs to carriers' customers, we don't think network risk is one that carriers would take lightly or put in jeopardy for minimal cost savings, adding even more to the amount a rival would likely need undercut prices to coax carriers into making the gamble. History suggests that carriers hesitate to leave towers that they are on, as churn for American Tower is typically 1%-2%, inclusive of churn related to industry consolidation.

Even if a competitor wanted to take on an incumbent, it could struggle to obtain the permits necessary to build a tower. Towers are subject to zoning restrictions, and zoning authorities and community residents often oppose tower construction in their communities. The opposition has obviously not been such an impediment that it precludes towers from ever gaining approval, but we think additional towers in areas that already have sufficient network coverage would face significantly greater difficulty obtaining approval than those that are built to improve a network, thus making tower construction for the sole purpose of providing competition a much more difficult regulatory endeavor.

While we think barriers to competition for the existing public tower companies are overwhelming in the near term, a couple of factors reduce our visibility over a 20-year span, keeping us from labeling American Tower's moat as wide. First, the tower companies typically lease significantly more land than they own. At the end of 2018, American Tower owned only about 10% of the land under its towers. Its leases typically have initial terms of five to 10 years and give it the option for at least one renewal period. Under existing leases, American Tower controls the land under more than 46% of its towers until 2028 or later, so we don't think it is a significant near-term concern. However, as leases need to be renegotiated, we have less confidence that the tower companies have leverage over land owners or advantages versus other potential land tenants. We think competitors are unlikely to build competing towers in tower vicinities; we think their better competitive move would be to secure available land where towers already exist. While incumbents may be best positioned to hold on to their land, they may be forced to do it on less favorable terms, which could affect returns.

The other factor that could affect towers over the long term is technology changes. We expect 5G to become the standard in the U.S. at some point during the next decade, and with 5G will come greater use of small cells, meaning carriers will rely more on smaller structures, such as light poles, and potentially less on macro towers like American Tower operates. Again, we are less concerned that this will be a major threat in the near term for American Tower. First, about 45% of the company's property revenue comes from outside the U.S., and many of those markets lag the U.S. technologically and will continue building 4G networks over the next decade. Second, because small cells have much smaller coverage areas, many more of them need to be deployed to blanket the same area that towers do. As a result, we think even if they were ultimately to be a replacement, which we doubt, it will take a long time horizon to get there. Small cells are significantly more expensive to deploy over a given area of coverage, meaning carriers are likely to continue to prefer macro towers when feasible. Since American Tower's locations are skewed toward rural and suburban locations rather than dense, urban markets, we expect theirs would either be the last towers to be disrupted by small cells, or, perhaps more likely, macro towers will continue to be the preferred structures in those areas even with a 5G standard. It is too early to say exactly what the 5G network will require and how big a threat it is to the macro tower model. We don't expect it will negatively affect American Tower substantially over the next decade, but we cannot yet speculate on what it or subsequent technologies might mean to the tower model 20 years from now.

Fair Value and Profit Drivers | by Matthew Dolgin Updated Aug 01, 2019

We are raising our fair value estimate for American Tower to $163 from $160, due primarily to the time value of money. Our valuation implies P/AFFO and adjusted EV/EBITDA multiples of 21 and 20, respectively, on our 2019 forecasts, both roughly in line with where the stock has traded for much of the past decade.

We project revenue growth to average about 7% annually over the next five years while adjusted EBITDA margin expands 400 basis points from 61% in 2018, more comparable to levels seen at the beginning of the decade. Still, we expect gross margin to expand less, as the lower margin international business becomes a bigger portion of total revenue.

We project U.S. revenue to grow 6%-7% annually over our five-year forecast, with colocation and amendment growth remaining close to 5% per year as carriers continue investing in their networks to accommodate greater data usage; escalators holding steady at 3%; and churn gradually getting to below 1% as contracts for recently defunct carriers continue to get worked off. We assume relatively few towers will be built and acquired in the U.S., contributing to a modest decline in the company's capital expenditures and to a 300-basis-point rise in segment gross margin.

We expect investment to stay elevated in American Tower's international geographies, where we forecast the tower portfolio to grow by about 3,000 to 4,000 per year. We expect collective international growth on existing towers to be 8%-9% annually from 2020-23 (after the effects from Indian carrier consolidation moderate), and we expect new tower billings to add about 2% per year after 2019. The new towers and a bigger revenue shift toward the lower-margin Indian business should lead to a slight drop in gross margin over the next few years, but we expect it to be back to 2018 levels by 2023.

Risk and Uncertainty | by Matthew Dolgin Updated Mar 02, 2019

We see American Tower as a medium uncertainty stock. Though the magnitude of growth will likely vary, we are confident mobile data usage will continue growing throughout the world, and American Tower is well positioned to benefit.

Beyond simple variance in demand growth, we see a few secular risks, but we don't think any are cause for significant concern.

Greater use of small cells by carriers, which we expect to be more likely with 5G, could affect tower demand. American Tower's doesn't participate in the U.S. outdoor small cell market, so any move away from towers would be detrimental. However, we believe towers will continue to be carriers' most cost-effective option when they are available. Further mitigating the small cell risk is American Tower's geographical footprint, which is predominantly suburban and rural. Less densely populated areas are far less conducive to small cells, so if small cells become a viable alternative for some towers, we expect it to be mostly just in urban areas for the foreseeable future.

Another long-term risk is that American Tower perpetually controls only 31% of its U.S. land, leaving it largely subject to landlords and leases. We think competitors are hard-pressed to compete with alternative towers, so they could instead bid for American Tower's land as leases expire. However, American Tower's diversified landlord base (90% of its leases are with landlords who own only one site) makes big losses less likely. Also, American Tower owns its towers, so changes in land control could be complicated. Although American Tower owns very little international land, those geographies pose less concern, because land is generally cheaper, and rents are directly passed on to carriers.

Health of carriers is important, but we find it less significant. Though consolidation or carrier bankruptcies would cause volatility, we think investment ultimately ends up at a similar place to support the networks required to meet consumers' data demands.

Stewardship | by Matthew Dolgin Updated Mar 02, 2019

We label American Tower as having Standard stewardship. The board is made up of 10 directors, nine of whom are independent, and each is up for re-election annually, which we see as shareholder-friendly. However, seven directors have been on the board for more than 10 years, which causes us some concern about their ability to be truly independent from management. The board is chaired by Jim Taiclet, who has served in that role since 2004 and has also been CEO since 2003. While we think a splitting of the chairman and CEO roles is preferable in the name of good corporate governance, we think strategic decisions for American Tower have a long record of being sound.

In our view, management has been smart to diversify its investments over a wide range of countries to participate in data growth in developing countries. A significant presence in India, Brazil, and Mexico gives it multiple markets in which to profit, while limiting exposure in case of slower market development. The company regularly spends multiple billion dollars per year in acquisitions (mostly towers) in the U.S. and abroad, yet it consistently posts excess returns on its invested capital (every year since at least 2008) and has rarely written down goodwill. We also project it will continue to return over $1 billion in capital to shareholders each year with its dividend, which, as a REIT, must continue to grow along with earnings growth.

We think compensation of management is well aligned with the best interests of shareholders. Only 10%-15% of executive compensation is in the form of base salary, and about 75% of target compensation is in the form of American Tower stock. Executive bonuses are 80% based on company, rather than individual, performance. Further, executive officers and directors are required own stock worth 3-6 times their base salaries (annual retainers for directors). Each of the company's seven executive officers has been with American Tower for at least nine years.

Mstar of Johnson

Oklahoma Opioid Case Goes Against J&J, but We Expect Appeals Process to Lead to Lower Payment
Damien Conover
Sector Director
Analyst Note | by Damien Conover Updated Aug 27, 2019

In one of the first state opioid cases, an Oklahoma judge ruled against Johnson & Johnson, awarding the state $572 million, well below the over $17 billion the state was seeking in damages. The amount is lower than many had expected, and J&J still plans to appeal the case. We expect the appeals process to take several years, and on appeal, we believe the amount will fall lower as we believe J&J largely provided appropriate marketing support around its opioid drug sales. Overall, we don't expect any change to our fair value estimate or moat rating for the company based on the ruling, and we continue to model in $1 billion in total opioid litigation costs for J&J.

The next steps in the opioid litigation process include other state cases and a likely long appeals process. Following the Oklahoma ruling, we expect an Ohio case will represent the next important step in determining the magnitude of the overall opioid litigation. The lack of early settlements by opioid drugmakers in Ohio (like Purdue's settlement in Oklahoma) suggest this state could be less sympathetic to the plaintiffs. Also, regardless of the outcome in Ohio, we expect the ruling will be similarly appealed, setting up a process that will likely take several years to complete.

The strong balance sheet at J&J likely entices many plaintiffs to target the firm. Within the opioid litigation landscape, plaintiffs are targeting several industries and firms for potentially causing addiction and overdoses of these powerful drugs. However, J&J holds one of the strongest balance sheets and most robust streams of cash flows, which makes it a larger target than many of the smaller specialty drug firms that carry much weaker financial positions. Even though J&J's opioid sales represent a small fraction of the overall prescriptions of opioid sales (less than 1% of state paid opioid prescriptions), we believe the deep pockets of J&J have made the firm a larger target than its opioid sales would suggest.

Business Strategy and Outlook | by Damien Conover Updated Apr 04, 2019

Johnson & Johnson stands alone as a leader across the major healthcare industries. The company maintains a diverse revenue base, a developing research pipeline, and exceptional cash flow generation that together create a wide economic moat.

J&J holds a leadership role in diverse healthcare segments, including medical devices, over-the-counter products, and several pharmaceutical markets. Contributing close to 50% of total revenue, the pharmaceutical division boasts several industry-leading drugs, including immunology drug Remicade and psoriasis drug Stelara. The medical device group brings in almost one third of sales, with the company holding controlling positions in many areas, including orthopedics and Ethicon Endo-Surgery's surgical devices. The consumer division largely rounds out the remaining business lines, and despite manufacturing issues over the past several years, the group still holds many brands with strong pricing power.

Research and development efforts are resulting in next-generation products. The pharmaceutical group has recently launched several new blockbusters. However, relative to the company's size, J&J needs to increase the number of meaningful drugs in late-stage development to support long-term growth. The company has also created new medical devices, including innovative contact lenses and minimally invasive surgical tools.

These multiple businesses generate substantial cash flow. J&J's healthy free cash flow (operating cash flow less capital expenditures) is over 20% of sales. Strong cash generation has enabled the firm to increase its dividend for over the past half century, and we expect this to continue. It also allows J&J to take advantage of acquisition opportunities that will augment growth.

Diverse operating segments coupled with expected new products insulate the company more from patent losses relative to other Big Pharma firms. Further, in contrast to most of its peers, J&J faces the majority of its near-term patent losses on hard-to-make complex drugs, which should likely slow generic competition.

Economic Moat | by Damien Conover Updated Apr 04, 2019

We believe Johnson & Johnson carries one of the widest moats in the healthcare sector, supported by intellectual property in the drug group, switching costs in the device segment, and strong brand power from the consumer group. The company's diverse revenue base, strong pipeline, and robust cash flow generation create a very wide economic moat. An extensive salesforce makes J&J a powerful candidate for a smaller biotechnology company looking to partner on a new drug, which strengthens Johnson & Johnson's ability to bring new products to market.

Johnson & Johnson's diverse operations are a major pillar supporting the wide moat. The company holds a leadership role in a number of segments, including medical devices, OTC medicines, and several drug markets. Further, the company is not overly dependent on one particular operating segment; the pharmaceutical business, medical device group, and consumer products represent 50%, 33%, and 17% of total sales, respectively. Additionally, within each segment no one product dominates sales, as Pfizer's Lipitor did. Despite carrying some lower-margin divisions, J&J maintains strong pricing power and has posted gross margins above 69% during the past five years, validating its strong competitive position.

Johnson & Johnson's R&D efforts support its robust revenue base. In pharmaceuticals, the company recently launched several new blockbusters, which should allow Johnson & Johnson to escape largely unscathed from upcoming patent expirations. Its efforts in medical devices, including minimally invasive surgical tools, should help maintain leadership in several medical device areas as well as support strong pricing power. Further, switching costs remain high with several of the device products. (For example, physicians switching vendors for hip and knee devices could take weeks if not months to learn the new products, which keeps physicians tied to the company's products.) On the consumer side, new product advancements combined with a solid brand power (reinforced by marketing campaigns) should sustain solid pricing power.

Fair Value and Profit Drivers | by Damien Conover Updated May 17, 2019

We are increasing our fair value estimate to $134 from $130 per share based on increased projections for recently highlighted late-stage pipeline drugs, especially new cancer drugs that hold strong pricing power and typically can reach the market with shorter development times. Overall, within the core drivers of cash flow, new immunology and oncology drugs are driving growth. Including the Actelion acquisition, we expect annual earnings per share growth will average 5% during the next five years, as strong growth in new pipeline drugs should offset some patent losses in the pharmaceutical division. We expect relatively flat operating margins over the next several years as waning cost-remediation efforts in the consumer group and increasing cost-containment efforts throughout the firm help offset margin pressure due to the loss of patent protection on several high-margin drugs, including immunology drug Remicade. Also, following 2019, we expect J&J to reduce its dependence on asset sales that the firm uses occasionally to boost overall earnings.

Risk and Uncertainty | by Damien Conover Updated Apr 04, 2019

Johnson & Johnson needs to overcome several roadblocks, including remaining litigation surrounding central nervous system drug Risperdal, talcum powder, surgical mesh products, and metal-on-metal hip and knee implants and several product recalls that could damage its sterling reputation. Over the longer term, the company faces typical healthcare risks such as reduced pricing power from both governments and pharmacy benefit managers, regulatory delays, and nonapprovals as well as increasingly aggressive generic competition for both small-molecule drugs and biologics. In particular, the biosimilar risk to Remicade is increasing, with several biosimilars working to gain more market share.

Stewardship | by Damien Conover Updated Apr 04, 2019

Overall, we view the stewardship at Johnson & Johnson as relatively Standard. While the firm has a good record of making sound capital deployment decisions and consistently generating returns on invested capital above the cost of capital, major recalls, the recent potential overpayment for Actelion and poor turnaround time in addressing manufacturing problems at certain key divisions lead us to a more balanced view of the company's leadership.

Industry veteran Alex Gorsky replaced longtime CEO Bill Weldon, who stepped down from the top position in 2012 after leading Johnson & Johnson since 2002. Given Weldon's age and the rigorous process to find his successor, we didn't see the change in leadership as a red flag. Gorsky brings a strong record of industry experience dating back to 1988, when he began in the industry as a pharmaceutical sales representative for Johnson & Johnson. His subsequent advancement through many management positions in the drug and device divisions at Johnson & Johnson along with a managerial post at Novartis gives him the broad experience needed to run the massive health conglomerate. The first major test of Gorsky's leadership was the $21 billion acquisition of orthopedic device firm Synthes, which was largely driven by Gorsky as head of Johnson & Johnson's device unit. While we believe that acquisition added important exposure to emerging markets and trauma devices, it appears to have had only a small impact on valuation, as the price paid for Synthes largely accounts for incremental benefits gained from the acquisition. The second major test for Gorsky is the recently completed Actelion deal, which we are skeptical will be able to create much value for shareholders due to the high acquisition price relative to our fair value.

Mstar of Johnson

Oklahoma Opioid Case Goes Against J&J, but We Expect Appeals Process to Lead to Lower Payment
Damien Conover
Sector Director
Analyst Note | by Damien Conover Updated Aug 27, 2019

In one of the first state opioid cases, an Oklahoma judge ruled against Johnson & Johnson, awarding the state $572 million, well below the over $17 billion the state was seeking in damages. The amount is lower than many had expected, and J&J still plans to appeal the case. We expect the appeals process to take several years, and on appeal, we believe the amount will fall lower as we believe J&J largely provided appropriate marketing support around its opioid drug sales. Overall, we don't expect any change to our fair value estimate or moat rating for the company based on the ruling, and we continue to model in $1 billion in total opioid litigation costs for J&J.

The next steps in the opioid litigation process include other state cases and a likely long appeals process. Following the Oklahoma ruling, we expect an Ohio case will represent the next important step in determining the magnitude of the overall opioid litigation. The lack of early settlements by opioid drugmakers in Ohio (like Purdue's settlement in Oklahoma) suggest this state could be less sympathetic to the plaintiffs. Also, regardless of the outcome in Ohio, we expect the ruling will be similarly appealed, setting up a process that will likely take several years to complete.

The strong balance sheet at J&J likely entices many plaintiffs to target the firm. Within the opioid litigation landscape, plaintiffs are targeting several industries and firms for potentially causing addiction and overdoses of these powerful drugs. However, J&J holds one of the strongest balance sheets and most robust streams of cash flows, which makes it a larger target than many of the smaller specialty drug firms that carry much weaker financial positions. Even though J&J's opioid sales represent a small fraction of the overall prescriptions of opioid sales (less than 1% of state paid opioid prescriptions), we believe the deep pockets of J&J have made the firm a larger target than its opioid sales would suggest.

Business Strategy and Outlook | by Damien Conover Updated Apr 04, 2019

Johnson & Johnson stands alone as a leader across the major healthcare industries. The company maintains a diverse revenue base, a developing research pipeline, and exceptional cash flow generation that together create a wide economic moat.

J&J holds a leadership role in diverse healthcare segments, including medical devices, over-the-counter products, and several pharmaceutical markets. Contributing close to 50% of total revenue, the pharmaceutical division boasts several industry-leading drugs, including immunology drug Remicade and psoriasis drug Stelara. The medical device group brings in almost one third of sales, with the company holding controlling positions in many areas, including orthopedics and Ethicon Endo-Surgery's surgical devices. The consumer division largely rounds out the remaining business lines, and despite manufacturing issues over the past several years, the group still holds many brands with strong pricing power.

Research and development efforts are resulting in next-generation products. The pharmaceutical group has recently launched several new blockbusters. However, relative to the company's size, J&J needs to increase the number of meaningful drugs in late-stage development to support long-term growth. The company has also created new medical devices, including innovative contact lenses and minimally invasive surgical tools.

These multiple businesses generate substantial cash flow. J&J's healthy free cash flow (operating cash flow less capital expenditures) is over 20% of sales. Strong cash generation has enabled the firm to increase its dividend for over the past half century, and we expect this to continue. It also allows J&J to take advantage of acquisition opportunities that will augment growth.

Diverse operating segments coupled with expected new products insulate the company more from patent losses relative to other Big Pharma firms. Further, in contrast to most of its peers, J&J faces the majority of its near-term patent losses on hard-to-make complex drugs, which should likely slow generic competition.

Economic Moat | by Damien Conover Updated Apr 04, 2019

We believe Johnson & Johnson carries one of the widest moats in the healthcare sector, supported by intellectual property in the drug group, switching costs in the device segment, and strong brand power from the consumer group. The company's diverse revenue base, strong pipeline, and robust cash flow generation create a very wide economic moat. An extensive salesforce makes J&J a powerful candidate for a smaller biotechnology company looking to partner on a new drug, which strengthens Johnson & Johnson's ability to bring new products to market.

Johnson & Johnson's diverse operations are a major pillar supporting the wide moat. The company holds a leadership role in a number of segments, including medical devices, OTC medicines, and several drug markets. Further, the company is not overly dependent on one particular operating segment; the pharmaceutical business, medical device group, and consumer products represent 50%, 33%, and 17% of total sales, respectively. Additionally, within each segment no one product dominates sales, as Pfizer's Lipitor did. Despite carrying some lower-margin divisions, J&J maintains strong pricing power and has posted gross margins above 69% during the past five years, validating its strong competitive position.

Johnson & Johnson's R&D efforts support its robust revenue base. In pharmaceuticals, the company recently launched several new blockbusters, which should allow Johnson & Johnson to escape largely unscathed from upcoming patent expirations. Its efforts in medical devices, including minimally invasive surgical tools, should help maintain leadership in several medical device areas as well as support strong pricing power. Further, switching costs remain high with several of the device products. (For example, physicians switching vendors for hip and knee devices could take weeks if not months to learn the new products, which keeps physicians tied to the company's products.) On the consumer side, new product advancements combined with a solid brand power (reinforced by marketing campaigns) should sustain solid pricing power.

Fair Value and Profit Drivers | by Damien Conover Updated May 17, 2019

We are increasing our fair value estimate to $134 from $130 per share based on increased projections for recently highlighted late-stage pipeline drugs, especially new cancer drugs that hold strong pricing power and typically can reach the market with shorter development times. Overall, within the core drivers of cash flow, new immunology and oncology drugs are driving growth. Including the Actelion acquisition, we expect annual earnings per share growth will average 5% during the next five years, as strong growth in new pipeline drugs should offset some patent losses in the pharmaceutical division. We expect relatively flat operating margins over the next several years as waning cost-remediation efforts in the consumer group and increasing cost-containment efforts throughout the firm help offset margin pressure due to the loss of patent protection on several high-margin drugs, including immunology drug Remicade. Also, following 2019, we expect J&J to reduce its dependence on asset sales that the firm uses occasionally to boost overall earnings.

Risk and Uncertainty | by Damien Conover Updated Apr 04, 2019

Johnson & Johnson needs to overcome several roadblocks, including remaining litigation surrounding central nervous system drug Risperdal, talcum powder, surgical mesh products, and metal-on-metal hip and knee implants and several product recalls that could damage its sterling reputation. Over the longer term, the company faces typical healthcare risks such as reduced pricing power from both governments and pharmacy benefit managers, regulatory delays, and nonapprovals as well as increasingly aggressive generic competition for both small-molecule drugs and biologics. In particular, the biosimilar risk to Remicade is increasing, with several biosimilars working to gain more market share.

Stewardship | by Damien Conover Updated Apr 04, 2019

Overall, we view the stewardship at Johnson & Johnson as relatively Standard. While the firm has a good record of making sound capital deployment decisions and consistently generating returns on invested capital above the cost of capital, major recalls, the recent potential overpayment for Actelion and poor turnaround time in addressing manufacturing problems at certain key divisions lead us to a more balanced view of the company's leadership.

Industry veteran Alex Gorsky replaced longtime CEO Bill Weldon, who stepped down from the top position in 2012 after leading Johnson & Johnson since 2002. Given Weldon's age and the rigorous process to find his successor, we didn't see the change in leadership as a red flag. Gorsky brings a strong record of industry experience dating back to 1988, when he began in the industry as a pharmaceutical sales representative for Johnson & Johnson. His subsequent advancement through many management positions in the drug and device divisions at Johnson & Johnson along with a managerial post at Novartis gives him the broad experience needed to run the massive health conglomerate. The first major test of Gorsky's leadership was the $21 billion acquisition of orthopedic device firm Synthes, which was largely driven by Gorsky as head of Johnson & Johnson's device unit. While we believe that acquisition added important exposure to emerging markets and trauma devices, it appears to have had only a small impact on valuation, as the price paid for Synthes largely accounts for incremental benefits gained from the acquisition. The second major test for Gorsky is the recently completed Actelion deal, which we are skeptical will be able to create much value for shareholders due to the high acquisition price relative to our fair value.

Mstar of Johnson

Oklahoma Opioid Case Goes Against J&J, but We Expect Appeals Process to Lead to Lower Payment
Damien Conover
Sector Director
Analyst Note | by Damien Conover Updated Aug 27, 2019

In one of the first state opioid cases, an Oklahoma judge ruled against Johnson & Johnson, awarding the state $572 million, well below the over $17 billion the state was seeking in damages. The amount is lower than many had expected, and J&J still plans to appeal the case. We expect the appeals process to take several years, and on appeal, we believe the amount will fall lower as we believe J&J largely provided appropriate marketing support around its opioid drug sales. Overall, we don't expect any change to our fair value estimate or moat rating for the company based on the ruling, and we continue to model in $1 billion in total opioid litigation costs for J&J.

The next steps in the opioid litigation process include other state cases and a likely long appeals process. Following the Oklahoma ruling, we expect an Ohio case will represent the next important step in determining the magnitude of the overall opioid litigation. The lack of early settlements by opioid drugmakers in Ohio (like Purdue's settlement in Oklahoma) suggest this state could be less sympathetic to the plaintiffs. Also, regardless of the outcome in Ohio, we expect the ruling will be similarly appealed, setting up a process that will likely take several years to complete.

The strong balance sheet at J&J likely entices many plaintiffs to target the firm. Within the opioid litigation landscape, plaintiffs are targeting several industries and firms for potentially causing addiction and overdoses of these powerful drugs. However, J&J holds one of the strongest balance sheets and most robust streams of cash flows, which makes it a larger target than many of the smaller specialty drug firms that carry much weaker financial positions. Even though J&J's opioid sales represent a small fraction of the overall prescriptions of opioid sales (less than 1% of state paid opioid prescriptions), we believe the deep pockets of J&J have made the firm a larger target than its opioid sales would suggest.

Business Strategy and Outlook | by Damien Conover Updated Apr 04, 2019

Johnson & Johnson stands alone as a leader across the major healthcare industries. The company maintains a diverse revenue base, a developing research pipeline, and exceptional cash flow generation that together create a wide economic moat.

J&J holds a leadership role in diverse healthcare segments, including medical devices, over-the-counter products, and several pharmaceutical markets. Contributing close to 50% of total revenue, the pharmaceutical division boasts several industry-leading drugs, including immunology drug Remicade and psoriasis drug Stelara. The medical device group brings in almost one third of sales, with the company holding controlling positions in many areas, including orthopedics and Ethicon Endo-Surgery's surgical devices. The consumer division largely rounds out the remaining business lines, and despite manufacturing issues over the past several years, the group still holds many brands with strong pricing power.

Research and development efforts are resulting in next-generation products. The pharmaceutical group has recently launched several new blockbusters. However, relative to the company's size, J&J needs to increase the number of meaningful drugs in late-stage development to support long-term growth. The company has also created new medical devices, including innovative contact lenses and minimally invasive surgical tools.

These multiple businesses generate substantial cash flow. J&J's healthy free cash flow (operating cash flow less capital expenditures) is over 20% of sales. Strong cash generation has enabled the firm to increase its dividend for over the past half century, and we expect this to continue. It also allows J&J to take advantage of acquisition opportunities that will augment growth.

Diverse operating segments coupled with expected new products insulate the company more from patent losses relative to other Big Pharma firms. Further, in contrast to most of its peers, J&J faces the majority of its near-term patent losses on hard-to-make complex drugs, which should likely slow generic competition.

Economic Moat | by Damien Conover Updated Apr 04, 2019

We believe Johnson & Johnson carries one of the widest moats in the healthcare sector, supported by intellectual property in the drug group, switching costs in the device segment, and strong brand power from the consumer group. The company's diverse revenue base, strong pipeline, and robust cash flow generation create a very wide economic moat. An extensive salesforce makes J&J a powerful candidate for a smaller biotechnology company looking to partner on a new drug, which strengthens Johnson & Johnson's ability to bring new products to market.

Johnson & Johnson's diverse operations are a major pillar supporting the wide moat. The company holds a leadership role in a number of segments, including medical devices, OTC medicines, and several drug markets. Further, the company is not overly dependent on one particular operating segment; the pharmaceutical business, medical device group, and consumer products represent 50%, 33%, and 17% of total sales, respectively. Additionally, within each segment no one product dominates sales, as Pfizer's Lipitor did. Despite carrying some lower-margin divisions, J&J maintains strong pricing power and has posted gross margins above 69% during the past five years, validating its strong competitive position.

Johnson & Johnson's R&D efforts support its robust revenue base. In pharmaceuticals, the company recently launched several new blockbusters, which should allow Johnson & Johnson to escape largely unscathed from upcoming patent expirations. Its efforts in medical devices, including minimally invasive surgical tools, should help maintain leadership in several medical device areas as well as support strong pricing power. Further, switching costs remain high with several of the device products. (For example, physicians switching vendors for hip and knee devices could take weeks if not months to learn the new products, which keeps physicians tied to the company's products.) On the consumer side, new product advancements combined with a solid brand power (reinforced by marketing campaigns) should sustain solid pricing power.

Fair Value and Profit Drivers | by Damien Conover Updated May 17, 2019

We are increasing our fair value estimate to $134 from $130 per share based on increased projections for recently highlighted late-stage pipeline drugs, especially new cancer drugs that hold strong pricing power and typically can reach the market with shorter development times. Overall, within the core drivers of cash flow, new immunology and oncology drugs are driving growth. Including the Actelion acquisition, we expect annual earnings per share growth will average 5% during the next five years, as strong growth in new pipeline drugs should offset some patent losses in the pharmaceutical division. We expect relatively flat operating margins over the next several years as waning cost-remediation efforts in the consumer group and increasing cost-containment efforts throughout the firm help offset margin pressure due to the loss of patent protection on several high-margin drugs, including immunology drug Remicade. Also, following 2019, we expect J&J to reduce its dependence on asset sales that the firm uses occasionally to boost overall earnings.

Risk and Uncertainty | by Damien Conover Updated Apr 04, 2019

Johnson & Johnson needs to overcome several roadblocks, including remaining litigation surrounding central nervous system drug Risperdal, talcum powder, surgical mesh products, and metal-on-metal hip and knee implants and several product recalls that could damage its sterling reputation. Over the longer term, the company faces typical healthcare risks such as reduced pricing power from both governments and pharmacy benefit managers, regulatory delays, and nonapprovals as well as increasingly aggressive generic competition for both small-molecule drugs and biologics. In particular, the biosimilar risk to Remicade is increasing, with several biosimilars working to gain more market share.

Stewardship | by Damien Conover Updated Apr 04, 2019

Overall, we view the stewardship at Johnson & Johnson as relatively Standard. While the firm has a good record of making sound capital deployment decisions and consistently generating returns on invested capital above the cost of capital, major recalls, the recent potential overpayment for Actelion and poor turnaround time in addressing manufacturing problems at certain key divisions lead us to a more balanced view of the company's leadership.

Industry veteran Alex Gorsky replaced longtime CEO Bill Weldon, who stepped down from the top position in 2012 after leading Johnson & Johnson since 2002. Given Weldon's age and the rigorous process to find his successor, we didn't see the change in leadership as a red flag. Gorsky brings a strong record of industry experience dating back to 1988, when he began in the industry as a pharmaceutical sales representative for Johnson & Johnson. His subsequent advancement through many management positions in the drug and device divisions at Johnson & Johnson along with a managerial post at Novartis gives him the broad experience needed to run the massive health conglomerate. The first major test of Gorsky's leadership was the $21 billion acquisition of orthopedic device firm Synthes, which was largely driven by Gorsky as head of Johnson & Johnson's device unit. While we believe that acquisition added important exposure to emerging markets and trauma devices, it appears to have had only a small impact on valuation, as the price paid for Synthes largely accounts for incremental benefits gained from the acquisition. The second major test for Gorsky is the recently completed Actelion deal, which we are skeptical will be able to create much value for shareholders due to the high acquisition price relative to our fair value.

Mstar of Square

Square Sees Strong Growth in 2Q, but Still No Profitability
Brett Horn
Senior Equity Analyst
Analyst Note | by Brett Horn Updated Aug 02, 2019

Square continued to see impressive growth in the second quarter, but also continues to have issues in translating this growth into better profitability. Overall, we see little to change our long-term view, and will maintain our $49 fair value estimate and narrow-moat rating.

Square continues to see strong growth, with adjusted revenue up 46% year over year. The mix of this growth remained consistent as the company builds out more ancillary products, with transaction-based revenue up a relatively modest 24% and subscription and service-based revenue up 87%. To effectively scale, we think Square needs to both move upmarket and build out its ancillary services. The strong subscription and service growth provides supports for the latter idea, and the volume shift toward larger sellers provides evidence that Square can expand beyond micro-merchants. In the quarter, 54% of gross payment volume came from sellers with more than $125,000 in annual volume compared with 50% last year.

While Square's top line continues to soar, the company needs to show at some point that it can unlock the scalability of the business model and translate this growth into profitability. The quarter provided only limited evidence of this. Square's adjusted EBITDA margin did improve to 18.7% from 17.7% last year. However, this metric excludes line items that we consider real costs, primarily stock compensation. On a GAAP basis, the company continues to report modest losses. We appreciate the fact that margins might be held back somewhat by investment to maintain growth, but the company's inability to achieve strong margin improvement supports our view that Square's margins might ultimately be somewhat constrained given the relative lack of volume in its small business niche. We think that the current market price is overly optimistic about the company's long-term profitability potential.

Business Strategy and Outlook | by Brett Horn Updated Apr 16, 2019

We think Square's business model, characterized by efficient client onboarding, innovative point-of-sale devices, flat fees, and an internally developed and integrated set of software solutions, allows the company to reach and retain micro merchants that are unviable for other acquirers. In essence, we believe Square's success has largely come from expanding the acquiring market, as opposed to stealing material share from existing players.

To develop sufficient scale, Square must move past its micro merchant base, and recent results suggest it is doing just that. At this point, slightly more than half of its payment volume comes from merchants generating over $125,000 in annual gross payment volume. Furthermore, absolute growth in clients above this threshold has accelerated meaningfully over the past couple of years, while absolute growth in merchants below this threshold has largely held steady.

Additionally, the company is making significant progress in cross-selling ancillary services, such Instant Deposit and Caviar, into its merchant client base. We think the move upstream and cross-selling will allow Square to materially improve margins in the years ahead and show the viability of its business model.

But we see Square as a narrow-moat niche operator, not a disrupter, with market share limited by its relatively high pricing and long-term margins constrained by its relative lack of scale. We think the company's most value-creative long-term opportunity lies in expanding internationally, as opposed to displacing leading domestic acquirers.

The company's effort to build out a consumer business surrounding its Cash App creates some option value. However, this business looks like a long shot to us, as Square is competing in a space with winner-take-all dynamics, and its competitors have a sizable lead in users and large consumer customer bases. Further, we have concerns that Cash App could ultimately be a distraction from more attractive opportunities in the core business.

Economic Moat | by Brett Horn Updated Apr 16, 2019

Payment processing of any type is a highly scalable business, as once a payment platform is established, there is little incremental cost to additional transactions. As a result, a handful of acquirers have come to dominate the industry. However, these traditional players left some areas open for new competition. Square initially rose to serve micro merchants, which are economically unviable for larger acquirers because of low volume. We think Square's business model, characterized by client onboarding, innovative point-of-sale devices, flat fees, and an internally developed and integrated set of software solutions, allows it to reach and retain these merchants effectively. Square has seen dramatic growth over the years, and while it remains unprofitable, we think the company's position in its niche is solidified and that it is nearing the point where it can generate attractive returns. As a result, we are changing our moat rating to narrow from none.

While Square's overall acquiring market share is tiny (we estimate that the company has about 1% of the U.S. market), we think that, in terms of scale, market share should be viewed in the context of the merchant segment an acquirer serves. For example, Global Payment's market share is much smaller than Worldpay's or First Data's, but we believe that within the small and midsize merchant base where the company focuses, its share is sufficient to create economies of scale. Similarly, we think Square's position among micro and small merchants has reached a point where the company has developed a cost advantage over any potential new entrants. We view switching costs as a secondary moat source for acquirers. On this front, we think Square looks good, as well. We believe the company's focus on building out an internally developed and integrated set of software solutions has been one of the keys to its success, and the ability to bundle acquiring within a larger set of solutions has become increasingly important for merchants. Larger acquirers often rely on partnerships with outside software companies, whereas Square generally controls the entire customer relationship. Its focus on micro and small merchants makes this more feasible, as their needs are not as complex. However, we believe this makes switching costs a more important aspect of Square's moat, relative to larger acquirers.

Recent results suggest that Square can make some inroads and move upstream in terms of merchant size. At this point, a little more than half of the company's gross payment volume comes from merchants generating more than $125,000 in annual gross payment volume. In our view, this is roughly where these merchants start to become viable for more traditional acquirers. We believe Square's suite of offerings, quick start-up time, and simplified pricing will allow it to attract enough merchants above the $125,000 level to scale and reach an attractive overall return. However, Square's pricing is significantly higher than that of traditional acquirers (we estimate Square's net revenue as a percentage of gross payment volume to be about double that of Global Payments), which we believe will be a limiting factor. In sum, we think Square can carve out enough share in its niche to become a sustainable and attractive franchise, but we do not see it as disruptive to the larger acquirers.

While profitability is trending in the right direction, Square remains unprofitable. However, we think scale in the acquiring service and the contribution from ancillary products such as Caviar and Square Capital will lead to strong margin improvement and excess returns within a few years, and that returns in the years following will be multiples of any reasonable cost of equity, given the limited amount of capital the business requires.

Fair Value and Profit Drivers | by Brett Horn Updated Apr 16, 2019

We are increasing our fair value estimate to $49 per share from $44. The increase is mainly due to time value since our last update, but we have also modestly adjusted our growth and margin assumptions. Our fair value estimate equates to a price/2019 sales ratio of 4.4 times and 66.0 times adjusted 2019 earnings.

We forecast strong growth overall, with total revenue growing at a 27% compound annual growth rate over the next five years and 19% over the next 10. We project acquiring revenue to grow at a 15% CAGR over the next 10 years. If the domestic acquiring market grew at an 8% rate over this time frame, this would imply roughly 4%-5% market share for Square at the end of our 10-year projection period.

We expect growth in subscription/service revenue to be much stronger and for this area to be a more critical growth engine. Due in part to the low starting point, we project subscription/service revenue to grow at a 40% CAGR over the next five years and 27% over the next 10. By the end of our projection period, subscription/service revenue makes up about 35% of total revenue.

We expect margins to improve fairly dramatically in the years ahead, as Square more fully monetizes its client base and scales. Management prefers an adjusted EBITDA margin metric. This figure excludes interchange revenue from the top line and excludes certain costs. We don't see this metric as indicative of true profitability as it excludes stock compensation, which we view as a real and ongoing cost. However, management has said it believes the company can achieve a level of 35%-40% on this basis, although it hesitates to give a timeline. Our projections assume Square can ultimately achieve a level close to the top end of this range. This EBITDA margin level equates to a GAAP operating margin of 16% by the end of our 10-year projection period. On a comparable basis, this is a level lower than that achieved by larger acquirers, which we believe this is reasonable due to the limited amount of scale available within Square's micro and small merchant client base.

We use a cost of equity of 9%.

Risk and Uncertainty | by Brett Horn Updated Apr 16, 2019

Because Square's revenue is directly tied to revenue at its merchant customers, it is sensitive to macroeconomic conditions, and its focus on micro and small merchants magnifies this dynamic, as small merchants can fail in large numbers during recessions. We think its clients' demonstrated eagerness for products such as Instant Deposit and Square Capital suggests its client base might be fragile, and we would note that the company's rise has taken place in the context of an improving economy. If the performance of Square Capital loans is weak, Square's investors could flee, which could magnify the economic impact in the rest of the business. Square's international operations also present currency and execution risk. Historically, the industry has experienced system breaches, which creates event risk. Finally, the company's efforts to launch a consumer business surrounding its Cash App could fail, and payment platforms tend to exhibit winner-take-all dynamics, which could leave Square's platform sputtering if it is not a long-term leader.

Square is a fast-growing, highly scalable business, which creates a wide range of possibilities. This consideration is the primary factor behind our very high uncertainty rating.

Stewardship | by Brett Horn Updated Apr 16, 2019

Our stewardship rating for Square is Standard. The company is led by Jack Dorsey. Dorsey and Jim McKelvey founded the company, and McKelvey remains on the board. We credit management with developing a unique business model, and we think management's holistic approach to designing a suite of services useful to its merchant clients has been a key pillar in Square's success.

On the negative side, Dorsey is splitting his time across two companies (he is also the CEO of Twitter), and we think investors should recognize that he effectively has control of Square, as he serves as both CEO and chairman and owns about 45% of shares.

We think Dorsey's conflicts are especially important at the moment, as we have concerns that the Cash App could prove to be a distraction. Square is still a small business with a lot of growth prospects on the acquiring side, which is still growing at almost a 30% rate. Further, we think Square's model is well suited for international expansion, an area the company has just begun to explore. We think Square has more than enough value-creative opportunities on the merchant side to fully occupy management's attention, and the launch of the Cash App business could lead to some of those opportunities being missed.

CFO Sarah Friar recently departed. We don't see this as a sign of internal strife, as she left to take a CEO role at social network Nextdoor. But with Dorsey's attention divided, the CFO role at Square takes on somewhat outsize importance. In January, Friar was replaced by Amrita Ahuja. Ahuja previously spent eight years at Blizzard Entertainment and held the CFO position there.